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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. sec. 78 - 2 - 2 (3) (j) 
(2002). This Court granted certiorari on November 29,2005. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Whether Pine Meadow Ranch, Inc. ("PMRI") has the authority as a 
beneficial owner to impose binding covenants, conditions and restrictions? 
Standard of Review: This is an appeal of a summary judgment. The 
standard of review is to review the issues of law for correctness with no deference to 
the trial court, Grynberg v. Questar Pipleline Co., 2002 UT 8, para. 20,70 P.3d 1,6; 
CITATION TO THE RECORD SHOWING ISSUES WERE PRESERVED 
Power of a Trust Beneficiary to Deal with Trust Assets. In the record of 
Forest Meadows, R-0378. 
5 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. sec. 2 5 - 5 - 1 ("Utah Statute of Frauds.") (1998): 
"No estate or interest in real property, other than leases for a term not 
exceeding one year, nor any trust or power over or concerning real property 
or in any manner relating thereto, shall be created, granted, assigned, 
surrendered or declared otherwise than by act or operation of law, or by deed 
or conveyance in writing subscribed by the party creating, granting, 
assigning, surrendering or declaring the same, or by his lawful agent 
thereunto authorized in writing." 
Utah Code Ann. sec. 38 - 9 - 1 (6) (Wrongful Lien, "Definitions") (2005): 
""Wrongful lien" means any document that purports to create a lien or 
encumbrance on an owner's interest in certain real property and at the time it 
is recorded or filed is not: . 
(c) signed by or authorized pursuant to a document signed by the owner 
of the real property." 
Utah Code Ann. sec. 57- 1 - 12 ("Form of warranty deed - Effect.") (2000). 
A warranty deed when executed as required by law shall have the 
effect of a conveyance in fee simple to the grantee, his heirs and assigns, of 
the premises therein named, together with all the appurtenances, rights, and 
privileges thereunto belonging, . . . ." 
Utah Code Ann. sec. 5 7 - 3 - 1 0 3 ("Effect of failure to record.") (2000). 
"Each document not recorded as provided in this title is void as against any 
subsequent purchaser of the same real property, or any portion of it, if: 
(1) the subsequent purchaser purchased the property in good faith and 
for a valuable consideration; and 
(2) the subsequent purchaser's document is first duly recorded." 
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Utah Code Ann. sec. 6 8 - 3 - 1 ("Common law adopted") (2004). 
"The common law of England so far as it was not repugnant to, or in conflict 
with, the constitution of laws of the United States, or the constitution or laws 
of this state, and so far only as it is consistent with and adapted to the natural 
and physical conditions of this state and the necessities of the people hereof, 
is hereby adopted, and shall be the rule of decision in all courts of this state." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In 1965, F.E. Bates and his wife Mae P. Bates deeded a large tract of land in 
Summit County (4,264.68 acres, more or less) by warranty deed to "Security Title 
Company, Trustee, a corporation of Utah." There is no contemporaneous evidence 
that a trust actually existed or, if a trust did exist, who were it beneficiaries what 
were its terms. A copy of the 1965 Bates deed is Addendum document "1". [R-
0202]. 
Eight years later, on August 15,1973, W. Brent Jensen, purporting to act as 
the president of "Pine Meadow Ranch" ['PMRI'] " executed and acknowledged in 
corporate form a "Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions" 
("CC&R's) for part of the area covered by the 1965 Bates Deed (approximately 
1,200 acres out of the 4,264.68.) These 1973 CC&R's were recorded on September 
28,1973. A copy of the 1973 CC&R's is Document "2" in the Addendum. R-0221-
230. 
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At the time W. Brent Jensen executed the 1973 CC&R's (August 15,1973), 
Pine Meadow Ranch, Inc., ("PMRI") did not yet exist. It was incorporated on 
August 22,1973. R-0358 (certificate of incorporation). 
In the 1973 CC&R's, PMRI declares: 
"WHEREAS declarant is the owner of or intends to acquire certain property 
in Summit County, State of Utah, which is more particularly described as: 
The South one-half of section 16; the East half of the Southeast quarter 
of Section 17; the East half of the East half of Section 20; All of 
Section 21; all in Township 1 North, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian (containing approximately 1,200 acres)." R-0221. 
There is no mention of a trust in the declaration. PMRI does not describe itself as 
the beneficiary of a trust. PMRI declares it "is the owner of or intends to acquire" 
the property. Nothing in the real estate records shows that it then owned or later 
acquired the 1,200 acres. 
The declaration includes "all of Section 21." By so doing, the declaration 
purports to impose the 1973 CC&R's on the western portion of Forest Meadow 
Ranch Plat D (the subdivision involved in the companion case). But, in the 
companion case, Forest Meadows Property Owners Ass 'n, etc., the trial court ruled 
that this property was owned by Security Title Company as trustee for the benefit of 
Deseret Diversified Development as beneficiary. 
Three years later, on May 6,1976, "Pine Meadow Ranch Plat 'D'" was 
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recorded at the Summit County Recorder's office. R0204-205. The "Owner's 
Dedication" on the plat reads as follows. 
"OWNER'S DEDICATION 
"Know all men by these presents that , the undersigned owner 
( ) of the above described tract of land, having caused the same to be subdivided 
into lots and streets to be hereafter known as the 
PINE MEADOW RANCH. PLAT "D" 
do hereby dedicate for perpetual use of the public all parcels of land shown on this 
plat as intended for public use. 
"In witness whereof have hereunto set this 
day of , A.D. 19 
PINE MEADOW RANCH 
/s/ W. Brent Jensen /s/ Zella J. Jensen 
Wesley Brent Jensen Zella J. Jensen 
President Secretary 
SECURITY TITLE CO., TRUSTEE 
/s/ Gordon H. Dick /s/ Nancy H. Bartlette 
Exec Vice President Asst, Secretary" 
The following "Subdividers Note" appears on the plat: 
"SUBDIVIDERS NOTE 
"The recording of this plat shall not constitute a dedication of roads and 
streets or rights of way to public. It is intended that all streets shown hereon shall 
remain the property of the subdivider, Pine Meadow Ranch, and shall be completely 
maintained by said owner. 
/s/ Pine Meadows Ranch 
W. Brent Jensen" 
Nothing on the plat makes reference to a trust and PMRI does not describe itself as 
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the beneficiary of a trust. W. Brent Jensen did not sign Plat D for Security Title. 
Gordon H. Dick signed for Security Title as its executive vice president. 
On July 7,1977, Security Title Company, Trustee, conveyed Lot 6, Pine 
Meadow Ranch Plat "D," to Mountainland Properties, Inc.. This lot was eventually 
acquired by Petitioner. 
On December 31,1979, PMRI was dissolved for failing to file its annual 
report. R-0381-383 (certificate of dissolution). 
On July 25,1980, Defendant recorded a "Notice of Lien" against Lot 6 by 
which it gave notice that it claimed liens against Lot 6 under the 1973 CC&R's "for 
the payment of annual maintenance assessment, annual water share fees, special 
maintenance assessments, penalties and interest on any or all of said items" ("1980 
Notice of Lien."). R-0232. 
On November 4,1987, Pine Meadow Ranch Plats E, F, G and I were 
recorded, these cover different areas within the 1,200 acres, but not all the 1,200 
acres. The following persons signed the "Owner's Dedications" on those plats. 
Plat Persons Signing the "Owners' Dedication 
Plat E (R-0445) Security Title Company Trustee by Craig F. Thomson, 
Pres. and Charles G. Miller, Sec. 
C. Mike Nielson 
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Earl Clayton and Margaret Clayton 
Plat F (R-0447) Security Title Company, Trustee by Craig F. Thomson, 
pres. and Charles G. Miller, sec. 
Herbert Rij and Renate Rij 
Plat G (R-0449) Security Title Company, Trustee by Craig F. Thomson, 
pres and Charles G. Miller, sec. 
Max E. Bangerter 
Howells, Inc. by Bobby G. Waggoner, vice pres. 
Larry LeRoy Smith and Sybil Burton Smith 
Plat I (R-0451) Security Title Company, Trustee by Craig F. Thomson, 
pres., and Charles A. Miller, sec. 
Neither PMRI nor W. Brent Jensen signed plats E, F, G, or I. 
Craig F. Thomson signed them for Security Title as its president. 
Even though Respondent recorded the Notice of Lien in 1980, it did not make 
any annual assessments until 2000. The roads were maintained by a Summit County 
special service district which used its taxing authority to raise money. In late 1999, 
Summit County decided was going to dissolve the special service district, 
Respondent said it was going to start making annual assessments, and Plaintiff filed 
this action as a petition under the Utah Wrongful Lien Statute to have the 1973 
CC&R's and the 1980 Notice of Lien declared wrongful liens because they had not 
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been signed by the owner of record, Security Title. The trial court dismissed the 
petition with prejudice, but allowed the action to proceed as a quiet title action. 
Petitioner and Respondent filed cross motions for summary judgment based 
on the recorded documents - the 1973 CC&R's, the plats and the deeds. The trial 
court granted summary judgment for Respondent principally on the grounds that 
PMRI had been the trust beneficiary in 1973 and as trust beneficiary had authority 
to impose binding CC&R's. 
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, Petitioner argued (1) that there was no 
evidence that a trust actually existed in 1965 other than the use of the word "trustee" 
on the Bates deed, (2) there was no identified trust beneficiary or terms of trust, (3) 
PMRI could not have been the beneficiary because it did not exist until 1973 (4) if 
PMRI had been trust beneficiary, it could not be in privity of estate with the lot 
owners because as trust beneficiary it had no "estate," (5) if PMRI had been the trust 
beneficiary, it did not have the authority as beneficiary to impose the 1973 CC&R's. 
The Court of Appeals rejected all Petitioner's arguments. It held that the 
following extrinsic evidence proved there actually was a trust in 1965 and that 
"Respondent" was the trust beneficiary in 1973. The Court of Appeals actually said 
"Respondent," but it must have meant PMRI. Accordingly, in this brief Petitioner 
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will substitute "PMRI" for "Respondent" whenever it describes the Court of 
Appeal's decision. The Court of Appeals held that the following extrinsic evidence 
that proved there actually was a trust in 1965 and that PMRI was the trust 
beneficiary in 1973. 
(1) Petitioner's title traces back to Security Title. 
(2) Security Title and PMRI recorded the plat identifying PMRI as "owner 
and subdivider" and Security Title as "trustee." 
(3) PMRI recorded the 1973 CC&R's, 
(4) The 1973 CC&R's expressly provide for assessments and a lien. 
The Court of Appeals gave no explanation of how this evidence proves as a matter 
of law there actually was a trust in 1965 and that PMRI was the trust beneficiary in 
1973. The Court of Appeals did not say who the trust beneficiary was in 1965 or 
what the terms of the trust were. 
In the next to last paragraph of its opinion, the Court of Appeals says that "W 
Brent Jensen acted as president of both Respondent [PMRI] and Security." The 
Court of Appeals does not say on what evidence it makes that statement. In the 
companion case it falsely says that W. Brent Jensen signed the plat in that case as 
president of Security Title. The plat in this case was signed by "Gordon H. Dick" 
for Security Title. The other plats in the area covered by the 1973 CC&R's were 
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signed by "Craig F. Thomson," the real president of Security Title. 
The Court of Appeals further held that there was privity of estate because 
Petitioner is a successor in interest to the estate of "the original covenanting 
parties," apparently meaning Security Title and Mountainland Properties, Inc., the 
person to whom it sold Lot 6 in 1977. 
The Court of Appeals held that Security Title ratified the 1973 CC&R's by 
recording the Plat. Explaining this ratification, the Court of Appeals said: 
"Rather, [PMRI] was acting as an agent of Security, regardless of whether 
the owner was Security or a trust with Security as trustee because W. Brent 
Jensen acted as president of both [PMRI] and Security." [Addendum Doc. 
"8" p. 3, lines 13-16] 
The Court of Appeals did not state the factual basis for its holding that PMRI was 
the agent of Security Title except to repeat the falsehood that W. Brent Jensen was 
the president of both corporations. Of course, the plat shows Gordon H. Dick was 
acting for Security Title. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
All the material facts are stated in the foregoing Statement of the case and 
Petitioner incorporates them by reference. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
In this case Petitioner makes the same arguments that the Petitioner made in 
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the companion case except for the last argument: 
(1) The law makes no distinction between authority to impose binding 
covenants, conditions, and restrictions ("CC&R's") on land and other powers of 
disposition. 
(2) A trust beneficiary (although a beneficial owner) has no power of 
disposition over trust property because the rule of law is that "the trustee has 
exclusive control over trust property, subject only to the limitations imposed by law 
or the trust instrument." 
(3) Because the names of the trust beneficiaries usually do not appear in the 
real estate records (as illustrated by this case), holding that a trust beneficiary has 
power of disposition over trust real property will compromise the integrity of the 
Utah recording system. 
(4) Holding that a trust beneficiary has power of disposition over trust 
property will defeat the fundamental basic purpose of trusts - to divide beneficial 
ownership of the property from control of the property to protect the interests of the 
beneficiary. 
(5) Security Title did not "ratify" the 1973 CC&R's by signing and recording 
the plat because (a) the CC&R's and the plat cover inconsistent areas, (b) even if 
PMRI was the beneficiary of Security Title, it was not the agent of Security Title. 
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ARGUMENTS 
1. The law makes no distinction between authority to impose binding 
covenants, conditions and restrictions on land and other powers of disposition. 
[Note: this is the same argument made in the companion case with only 
the names changed]. 
The issue framed by this Court is "whether Pine Meadow Ranch, Inc., had 
authority as a beneficial owner to impose binding covenants, conditions, and 
restrictions." This issue leads immediately to the question of whether imposing 
binding covenants, conditions, and restrictions on land is materially different from 
disposing of land in some other way - e.g., imposing an easement, imposing an 
equitable servitude, or simply selling the land. 
The law makes no distinction between one sort of disposition of land and 
another. The Utah Statute of Frauds provides: 
"No estate or interest in real property, other than leases for a term not 
exceeding one year, nor any trust or power over or concerning real property 
or in any manner relating thereto, shall be created, granted, assigned, 
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surrendered or declared other wise than by operation of law or by deed or 
conveyance in writing subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning, 
surrendering or declaring the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto 
authorized in writing." [Utah Code Ann. sec. 2 5 - 5 - 1 (1998)]. 
Covenants, conditions, and restrictions ("CC&R's) are interests in real property in 
the nature of real covenants (promises to do), equitable servitudes (promises not to 
do), and easements (non-possessory interests). The law treats them all alike 
because, as a practical matter, authority to impose binding CC&R's is authority to 
determine how land will be used. For example, suppose land is held in trust by T 
for the benefit of B. As trustee T determines that the most valuable use of the land 
is as a farm. If B as beneficial owner has authority to impose binding CC&R's 
limiting the land to residential development, T cannot fulfill the trustee's duty to 
manage the land as a farm. 
In effect, the decision to impose binding CC&R's is just one of many 
economic decisions the trustee must make as trustee. The law cannot carve out the 
particular economic decision to impose binding CC&R's and treat it differently 
from all the other economic decisions the trustee must make. 
2. The long established rule is that "the trustee has exclusive control 
over the trust property, subject only to the limitations imposed by law or the 
trust instrument," and the word "exclusive" precludes the beneficiary from 
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having any power of disposition. 
[Note: Again, this is the same argument made in the companion case.] 
This Court has said three times that "the trustee has exclusive control over the 
trust property subject only to the limitations imposed by law or the trust 
instrument."1 This is the uniform American rule.2 It is based on the fundamental 
principle of trust law that the trustee is responsible for the trust property (and the 
beneficiary is not) because the trustee has control (and the beneficiary does not). 
It is true that the beneficiary is the beneficial owner of the trust property, but 
this only means that the trust beneficiary has the risk of loss and chance of gain, not 
that the beneficiary has power of disposition. "Property" in land is frequently 
compared to a bundle of sticks, each stick representing a specific right with respect 
to the land. The trust beneficiary has the "stick" of risk of loss and chance of gain 
(beneficial ownership) but the trustee has the "stick" of power of disposition 
(exclusive control). 
A good analogy to beneficiaries of trust are shareholders of publicly held 
corporations. The shareholders are the beneficial owners of the corporations' assets 
1
 In Re Estate of Flake, 2003 UT 17, para. 12, 71 P.3d 589, 594; Matter of 
Estate of West, 948 P.2d 351,354 (Utah 1997); Continental Bank & Trust Co, v. 
Country Club Mobile Estates, Ltd., 632 P. 872 (Utah 1981). 
2
 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS sec. 2 (1959). 
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because they have risk of loss and chance of gain, but they have no control over 
those assets. The board of directors has control. The analogy of corporate law to 
trust law is so close that corporate law speaks of the duties of the board of directors 
to shareholders as "fiduciary" duties. 
Trust law regards the property interest of the beneficiary not as an interest in 
the trust property but as an interest in the trust itself. Thus, trust beneficiaries of 
non-spendthrift trusts have authority to dispose of their interests in the trust (in 
effect, to substitute their transferees as trust beneficiaries) but not the power to 
dispose of the trust property.3 Again, shareholders of publicly-held corporations are 
a good analogy. The shareholders have authority to sell their shares, but not to sell 
the corporations' assets. 
This division of beneficial ownership (held by the beneficiary) from control 
(held by the trustee) has been the rule of law for centuries. This Court should not 
change it now because stare decisis is important in trust law. Past trust settlors and 
their attorneys have relied on the established rule of law. They did not anticipate 
that the Utah Appellate Court would hold trust beneficiaries have power of 
disposition over trust property. If this Court confirms the existence of this new 
3
 See GEORGE T. BOGART, TRUSTS 132-42 (sec. 37 "Nature of Beneficiary's 
Interest" and Sec. 137 "Incidents of the beneficiary's Interest") (6th ed. 1987). 
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power, the trustees of these established trusts will not be able to protect their 
beneficiaries from the consequences of their beneficiaries' improvidence. 
3. The decision of this Court in Capital Assets Financial Services v. 
Maxwell does not stand for the proposition that beneficiaries have power of 
disposition over trust property. 
[Note: Again, this is the same argument made in the companion case, 
with some minor editorial changes.] 
The Utah Court of Appeals held in the companion case that a trust beneficiary 
has power of disposition in the following paragraph in its decision in the companion 
case: 
"Petitioner next argues that because Deseret had only a beneficial 
interest in the land granted in the Bates Deed, Deseret could not encumber 
Lot 105A [Lot 6]. However, Petitioner cites no authority stating that a 
beneficiary cannot encumber the trust res. In fact, there is authority to the 
contrary. See Capital Assets Fin. Servs. v. Maxwell. 2000 UT 9, para. 17, 
994 P.2d 201 (holding beneficial interest in real property could encumber that 
interest). In any event, we will not lose sight of the forest for the trees. 
Deseret's actions were subsequently ratified by Security when Deseret and 
Security filed Plat D." [2005 UT App 294, para. 36] 
It is true that Petitioner cited no authority to the effect that a trust beneficiary cannot 
encumber trust property, but the absence of negative authority is not the same thing 
as positive authority. The common law rule is that the trustee has exclusive control, 
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and Utah adopted the common law rule in 1898 by statute.4 The critical question is 
"what did the Utah Supreme Court actually hold in the case the Court of Appeals 
cites as positive authority, Capital Assets Financial Services v. Maxwell!" 
The facts in Capital Assets Financial Services are simple. A judgment had 
been entered against Christensen in favor of Lindsay. Christensen, the judgment 
debtor, wanted to borrow $50,000, so he asked a friend to transfer some real 
property to him to use as collateral. Lott, the daughter of the friend, provided the 
collateral by transferring some land to Christensen by unqualified quitclaim deed on 
the understanding that he would use it as collateral and then deed it back to her. 
Christensen obtained the $50,000 loan from Capital Assets on a deed of trust and 
then deeded the land (now subject to Capital Assets' deed of trust) back to Lott. 
Lindsay (Christensen's judgment creditor) claimed that as soon as Lott 
transferred the land to Christensen by quitclaim deed, his judgment lien attached 
and therefore Capital Assets' deed of trust was subordinate. Capital Assets 
countered with the argument that Christensen had taken the land as a trustee for the 
benefit of Lott as trust beneficiary, and, therefore, no judgment lien attached under 
4
 Utah Code Ann. sec. 6 8 - 3 - 1 ("Common law adopted") (2004). The 
common law rule governed in 1965 when the Bates Deed was delivered. Utah 
enacted the common law rule as the statutory rule in 1975 by enacting the Uniform 
Trustee's Powers Provisions of the Uniform Probate Code, Utah Code Ann. sec. 
75-7-40 c^cgr. (1993). 
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the established rule that a judgment lien does not attach to trust property held by a 
trustee/judgment debtor in trust for the benefit of another person. 
This Court refused to characterize the relationship between Christensen and 
Lott as a trust. In paragraph "17" this Court held: 
"There is a significant difference between the type of bare legal title 
possessed by an agent or trustee and the beneficial interest that Christensen 
undisputably possessed here. Agents and trustees have no direct beneficial 
interest in the property to which they hold title. Their title is purely for the 
benefit of another. In the instant case, Christensen received from Lott more 
than bare legal title. The quitclaim deed was consistent with passing a fee 
interest and the intent of the parties was to allow Christensen to use the 
property as security for his own benefit. To hold that Christensen's interest 
was a non-beneficial "bare legal title" would be inconsistent with chain of 
title and the intent of the parties." [2000 UT 9, para. 17,994 P.2d 201,205]. 
This is the same paragraph "17" that was cited by the Court of Appeals as holding 
that a trust beneficiary has power of disposition over trust property. 
It is impossible to reconcile this Court's actual holding (that there was no 
trust) with the Court of Appeals' statement of the holding (that a trust beneficiary 
has power to encumber). No reasonable person could have drawn the Court of 
Appeal's holding from the actual holding of this Court. It is beyond the range of 
"innocent mistake" or even "negligent mistake." The truth is sometimes a matter of 
degree - as when the defendant claimed he didn't know the revolver was loaded 
when he accidentally shot his wife - six times. 
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Petitioner respectfully asks this Court to think about the question of why the 
Court of Appeals so mischaracterized this Court's holding. The degree of falsity is 
on a par with its holding that W. Brent Jensen signed the Forest Meadow plat for 
Security Title when the document was actually signed by Leo D. Jensen. Could any 
Utah judge write the words "[W. Brent] Jensen signed on behalf of both Security 
and Deseret" without reading the plat? Could any Utah judge write the words 
"holding beneficial interest in real property could encumber that interest" without 
reading this Court's opinion? Ifthe Court of Appeals did read the plat and the 
opinion, why did it make these false statements? 
4. Holding that trust beneficiaries have power of disposition over real 
property held in trust will compromise the integrity of the Utah recording 
system. 
[Note: Again, this is the same argument, with some editorial changes, 
made in the companion case]. 
The holding of the Court of Appeals in this case is extraordinary in that it 
gives PMRI as trust beneficiary the authority to impose binding CC&R's even 
though its status as trust beneficiary does not appear of record. In fact, there is no 
indication in the record of who was the trust beneficiary in 1965 or in 1973. The 
Court of Appeals did not even attempt to justify its holding that PMRI was the trust 
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beneficiary in 1973. The Court will recall that the way the Court of Appeals 
justified its holding Deseret was a trust beneficiary in 1971 in the companion case 
was to falsely describe W. Brent Jensen as signing the plat for Security Title as its 
president (when the plat was actually signed by Leo D. Jensen as its vice president) 
and then, without citing any rule of law, to hold that this false fact proved as a 
matter of law that the interests that became Deseret were the trust beneficiaries in 
1965 and that Deseret was the trust beneficiary in 1971. But, in this case, the plat 
was signed by Gordon H. Dick for Security Title, so even that false justification 
does not apply here. 
Under Utah real property law, if a person other than the record owner has 
power of disposition over Utah real property, the expectation is that the power will 
appear of record. For example, if X gives Y power of disposition over land held of 
record by X, the expectation is that X will record a written power of attorney 
naming Y as X's agent, describing the property, and expressly granting Y power of 
disposition. 
Any power of disposition that is valid but not of record threatens the integrity 
of the Utah recording system because the exercise of that power will be by a deed 
that is both wild and valid. 
The point is best explained in three steps. The first step is to explain why 
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trust instruments with respect to real property are virtually never recorded. This 
may strike the Court as strange because the Utah Statute of Frauds expressly 
requires a written document to create a trust with respect to real property. Why is it 
the uniform practice not to record these written documents? 
Three good reasons are: (1) recording is a meaningless gesture, (2) recording 
makes any subsequent transferee's title less secure, and (3) recording makes 
information public that most people prefer to keep private. 
On the first reason, suppose land is deeded to "T as trustee." Does it matter 
whether there actually is a trust or not? It does not. If there is no trust, T has 
exclusive control over the land as both record and beneficial owner.5 If there is a 
trust, T has exclusive control over the land as trustee. Therefore, whether there 
actually is a trust or not (or what the terms of the trust may be, or who the 
beneficiaries of the trust may be) is of absolutely no importance at to anyone with 
whom the trustee deals. Recording the trust is a meaningless gesture. 
As for the second reason - that recording makes any transferee's title less 
secure - suppose the trust document is recorded and then the trustee sells the 
property in possible violation of the terms of the trust. The person who bought the 
5
 This is the effect of Utah Code Ann. sec. 57-1-12 ("Form of warranty 
deed - Effect") and 57 -1 -13 ("Form of quitclaim deed - Effect") (2000). 
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land may have acquired defective title due to constructive notice (due to the trust 
having been recorded) of the violation.6 The transferee's title is safer if the trust 
document is not recorded. 
On the third reason, recording a trust makes the trust a public document. 
Criminals and nosey people may read the document and use the information they 
obtain to make trouble for the trust beneficiaries and their families. 
So, the uniform practice is not to record the trust instrument even though the 
Utah Statute of Frauds requires that a trust in any manner relating to real property be 
in writing. 
The second step of the analysis is to see that while the actual existence of the 
trust is irrelevant if the trustee has exclusive control (whether as absolute owner or 
as trustee), it makes a great deal of difference if the trust beneficiary has power of 
disposition. If deeding land to "T as trustee" gives power of disposition to unnamed 
beneficiaries, then it very much matters whether there actually is a trust, what the 
terms of the trust are, and who are the beneficiaries. 
Please note that a deed to "T as trustee" (like the 1965 Bates deed in this 
case) is insufficient to create a trust in itself because it does not name the 
6
 See Utah Code Ann. sec. 15-1 - 406 ("Third persons protected in dealing 
with trustee") and sec. 15-1 - 409 (2) (1993). 
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beneficiaries or state the terms of the trust. It just conveys the property to T.7 
The third step is to understand the logic of the Utah recording system. The 
logic goes in a three stage process like the game of baseball. 
In baseball the fist stage is for the pitcher to throw the ball over the plate. If 
the pitcher can't do this, the batter gets to go to first base without even trying to hit 
the ball. However, if the pitcher throws the ball over the plate, the game goes to the 
second stage. The batter has to hit the ball. If the batter doesn't hit the ball (and it 
crosses the plate three times), the batter is out without the fielders even trying to 
make a play. But if the batter does hit the ball, the game goes to the third stage. 
The fielders have to make a play. 
Each stage is reached if and only if the prior step is accomplished. If the 
pitcher doesn't throw the ball over the plate, the batter can stand there looking at the 
clouds. If the batter doesn't hit the ball, the fielders can pass their time playing 
video games. 
The Utah Statute of Frauds and the Utah Recording Act sets up a similar three 
stage process. The fist stage is for the person asserting the interest in real property 
7
 It would, of course, be possible to create a trust by a deed that designated 
the grantee as trustee, identified the beneficiaries, stated the terms of the trust and 
conveyed the land as trust property, Utah Code Ann. sec. 75 - 7 - 409 (l)(a) 
(1993), see GEORGE A. BOGART, TRUSTS 22 (Sec. 10 (b) (6th ed. 1987). 
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to produce the written instrument creating that interest. In this case, that written 
instrument would be a trust document naming Security Title as trustee, naming the 
beneficiaries, and stating the terms of the trust. 
If Respondent had produced that trust document (if effect, throwing the ball 
over the plate), the law would go to the second stage. Petitioner could claim the 
trust document was void as to it under the Utah Recording Act because it was never 
recorded.8 If Petitioner made that claim (in effect, hitting the ball), the law would 
go on to the third stage. It would be up to Respondent to show that Petitioner could 
have discovered the trust document by reasonable inquiry (in effect, making a play). 
The point is that Respondent has not produced the trust document. The first 
stage of the law was never accomplished. Therefore, under the express language of 
the Utah Statute of Frauds, PMRI's power of disposition over real property was 
never validly created even if PMRI was the actual beneficiary of the trust. PMRI 
can be the actual trust beneficiary without compromising the integrity of the Utah 
recording system, but it can't have authority to impose binding CC&R's without 
compromising the integrity of the Utah recording system. 
The Utah Court of Appeals dealt with the three stage process of the Utah 
recording system by ignoring the first stage. In effect, it held that the word "trustee" 
8
 Utah Code Ann. sec. 57-3-103 ("Effect of failure to record") (2000). 
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on the Bates deed put Petitioner on inquiry notice that there might be a trust. This is 
perfectly true but totally insufficient. Petitioner being put on notice that there might 
be a trust is not the same thing as Respondent producing the trust document. Under 
the Utah Statute of Frauds, no trust document, no trust. Respondent never threw the 
ball over the plate. 
Finally, the reason why the holding of the Utah Court of Appeals will destroy 
the integrity of the Utah recording system is that when a deed shows that land is 
held in trust (e.g., by "T as trustee under the X family trust dated January 1,2006"), 
and someone records a wild deed purporting to dispose of the land in some way 
(e.g., by imposing CC&R's) the record will not show whether the person recording 
the wild deed was or was not a trust beneficiary because the trust document will not 
have been recorded. But, under the holding of the Court of Appeals, even if the 
trust document is never produced (as it has never been produced in this case), if the 
trial court thinks that the person signing the wild deed actually was a trust 
beneficiary (perhaps not on fabricated evidence as in this case, but on some valid 
evidence), the trial court must validate the wild deed. 
5. Holding that trust beneficiaries have power of disposition over trust 
property will defeat the basic purpose of trusts - to protect the beneficiary's 
beneficial ownership by holding the trustee responsible for the control of the 
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trust property. 
[Note: this is the same argument made in the companion case.] 
The basic purpose of a trust is to protect the beneficiary's beneficial 
ownership of the trust property by holding the trustee responsible for the control of 
the trust property. People do not create trusts because they want the beneficiaries to 
have control of the trust property. They create trusts because they want the trustees 
to have control of the trust property. 
"Control of the trust property" means making decisions with respect to the 
trust property - decisions like whether land is to be developed for residential use, or 
farmed, or rented out, or sold, or whatever. "Control of the trust property" can be 
more complicated than simply maximizing economic value. For example, a trust 
instrument may make the trustee responsible for managing a farm while preserving 
it as a farm and not turning it into something like a subdivision. 
If the trust beneficiary has authority to impose binding CC&R's (or any 
similar power of disposition), the trustee cannot fulfill the duty imposed by the 
terms of the trust. For example, suppose that a married couple, are getting on in 
years and set up an estate plan in the form of an intervivos trust. The general terms 
of the trust are income to them for their joint lives, income to the surviving spouse 
for life, and on the death of the surviving spouse for the trust property to be 
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distributed to their children. This Court dealt with this sort of trust in 2003 in In Re 
Estate of Flake.9 Anyway, the married couple are the initial trustees but after some 
years they decide to turn over the job to one of their sons because they no longer 
trust their own judgments. Then the husband dies. More years pass and the 
surviving wife is now 90 years old and somewhat forgetful. She lives in a 
retirement community and leaves all financial decisions to her son as trustee - but 
she does not lack the legal capacity to make a contract. 
The surviving wife is the sole income beneficiary. The children have future 
reminder interests but the son as trustee has power to invade corpus as he considers 
necessary or appropriate for the health and welfare of his mother. The trust is 
irrevocable and cannot be amended. Finally, the trust says nothing about whether 
the surviving spouse has any power of disposition over the trust assets. 
One of the assets held in trust is a tract of land title to which is held of record 
by the son "as trustee under the X Family Trust." The declaration of trust was not 
recorded. 
The issue is whether the surviving wife as beneficial owner has authority to 
impose binding CC&R's on the tract of land - exactly the same issue as in this case 
but with a complete factual setting, an actual trust document and known 
9
 2003UT17,71P.3d589. 
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beneficiaries. 
There is no conceivable reason why the established rule of law (that the 
trustee has the exclusive control over the trust property subject to the terms of the 
trust instrument and the law) should be overturned to give such a power to the 
surviving wife. The whole purpose of the trust is for the son to be responsible for 
making all the economic decisions. The economic decision to impose binding 
CC&R's cannot be pulled out and treated differently than the others. 
The law will have to go either all one way or all the other - either stay with 
the established rule that the trustee has exclusive control or permit the trust 
beneficiary to make whatever economic decisions she wants. If the law takes the 
latter route, the son cannot protect his mother from evil people who prey on the 
elderly. 
Sometimes courts don't appreciate the practical consequences of the decisions 
they make for the very best abstract reasons. In the world of legal abstractions, its 
seems plausible that the beneficial owner of land should be able to dispose of it in 
whatever way she pleases. But, on a practical level, how many Califomian hunters 
would come to Utah if Utah declared open season on hunting deer? And as a 
practical matter, what will happen if this Court declares open season on hunting 
elderly trust beneficiaries? 
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7. Security Title did not "ratify" the Rerecorded CC&R's by signing the 
plat because PMRI was not its agent, (2) PMRI did not purport to act for 
Security Title, (3) the Utah Statute of Frauds requires any agency with respect 
to real property to be in writing, (4) the plats and the 1973 CC&R's are 
inconsistent with each other. 
[Note: This is not the same argument as was made in the companion case. 
In this case the Court of Appeals did not base the agency relationship on the 
trust relationship, but entirely on the false fact that W. Brent Jensen was the 
president of Security Title.] 
The Court of Appeals appears to have decided this case on alternative 
grounds - (1) that PMRI as beneficial owner had authority to impose binding 
CC&R's, and (2) that Security Title "ratified" the 1973 CC&R's by signing and 
recording the plat. But, this Court limited certiorari to one issue, "whether [PMRI] 
had the authority as a beneficial owner to impose binding covenants, conditions, and 
restrictions." This limitation raises the question of whether this Court sent 
Petitioner on a fool's errand because even if Petitioner persuades the Court that 
PMRI did not have direct authority as trust beneficiary, this Court will not permit 
Petitioner to challenge the alternative grounds. 
In the companion case Petitioner argued that it had not been sent on a fool's 
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errand because both grounds of decision go to "authority" - to the authority of the 
beneficiary to impose binding CC&R's on its own behalf (the first grounds) or to 
the authority of the beneficiary to do so on behalf of its trustee (the alternative 
grounds). But in this case the Court of Appeals makes the agency depend not on the 
trust relationship but entirely on the false fact that W. Brent Jensen was the 
president of Security Title. In this case the Court of Appeals held: 
"Rather, Respondent [PMRI] was acting as an agent of Security, regardless of 
whether the owner was Security or a trust with Security as a trustee because 
W. Brent Jensen acted as president of both Respondent and Security." [2005 
UT App 265, para. 8, Addendum document "8" lines 13-16]. 
In short, the agency does not depend on the trust relationship, but on the false fact 
that W. Brent Jensen was the president of Security Title. 
Petitioner respectfully points out that unless this Court takes up the agency 
issue, it will give its approval to what it knows is a gross injustice. The truth is that 
W. Brent Jensen was never the president of Security Title. The record shows that 
the president of Security Title was Craig F. Thomson, and that Gordon H. Dick and 
Leo D. Jensen were vice presidents. 
Moving from fact to law, even if W. Brent Jensen had been the president of 
Security Title, that would not have made PMRI the agent of Security Title as a 
matter of law. Agency is created by the agent consenting to act for the benefit of 
34 
and subject to the control of the principal and the principal consenting that the agent 
so act.10 It is not created by two corporations having the same president. Then there 
is the point that under the Utah Statute of Frauds any agency with respect to real 
property must be created by a written document. There is none here. 
Then there is the obvious point that the 1973 CC&R's (for Pine Meadows 
Ranch) cover the western part of Forest Meadow Plat D, the part that extends into 
Section 21. No rational person would impose the 1973 CC&R's on the western part 
of Forest Meadow Plat D, the Rerecorded CC&R's on the southeastern part of 
Forest Meadow Plat D, and no CC&R's at all on the northeastern part of Forest 
Meadow Plat D. 
The holding of the Utah Court of Appeals cannot be defended on any moral 
or legal grounds. It is contrary to every principle of decency and law. But, and 
perhaps this is the decisive point, it could be avoided. This Court has the power to 
say "well, we did not grant certiorari with respect to that issue so we will not take it 
up no matter how immoral and illegal it may have been." But, it would amount to 
ratifying a falsehood. 
This Court has the power to avoid the issue, but it cannot avoid the moral 
responsibility. A play ground bully cannot justify beating up a weaker child by 
10
 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, sec. (1958). 
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saying "I promised myself I would beat you, and it would be wrong for me to break 
my promise." 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should first hold that PMRI did not have authority as beneficial 
owner (trust beneficiary) to impose binding covenants, conditions and restrictions. 
Next, on the agency issue (the alternative grounds of decision), this Court should 
rule that since the Court of Appeals based its holding that PMRI was the agent of 
the Security Title on a falsehood (i.e., that W. Brent Jensen was the president of 
Security Title) which this Court knows to be a falsehood, this Court cannot affirm 
on that grounds in good conscience. This Court should therefore order that 
certiorari be extended to the agency issue and that Petitioner and Respondent submit 
briefs. 
Dated: January 12,2006. 
Respectfully submitted: 
/s/Briyd Kimball Dyer f \ 
ATEQBKEY FOR PETITIONER/APPELLANT 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on the following date I served two copies of the forgoing Opening 
Brief (Corrected) by depositing the same in the U.S. Postal Service, first class postage 
prepaid, addressed to the following person: 
Mr. Edwin C. Barnes, Esq. 
Clyde Snow Sessions & Swenson 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 - 2216 
Dated: January 12,2006 
/s/Boy Siball Dyer / \ 
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ADDENDUM DOCUMENT "1" -1965 BATES DEED. 
Z01972. 
it — M. Fee Paid 5 - — ^ • . ^ i ? 
t" 
Mail tax notice to . 
"Oct.10 • 
Deo. Book pa-e C>_A:;.4.^. . : . . . .>3.;J5V- .T . . ._VP } 
Add.es, J s i^^JL^i^ 
Pea $6.$047 WARRANTY DEED 
F. E. BATES, also known as F. Ephralm Bates, and 
MAE P. BATES, also known as Mae Pritchett Bates, his wife 
of Coalville County of Summit 
CONVEY andWARRANT to 
Salt Lake City 
SECURITY TITLE COMPANY, TRUSTEE, 
a Corporation of Utah 
County Salt Lake 
grantor a 
State of Utah, hereby 
grantee 
, State of Utah 
for the sura of TEN DOLLARS AND OTHER GOOD AND VALUABLE CONSIDERATION ElOlftXXtt 
the following described tract o( land in 
Sate of Utah, to-wic 
Suosalt and Morgan County, 
The South half of Section 16; the East half of the Southeast 
quarter of Section 17; the East half of die East half of 
Section 20; all of Sections 21, 22, 27 and 28; the East half 
of the East half of Section 29; the North half and the North 
half of the South half of Section 33; the North half and the 
North half of the South half of Section 34; all In Township 
1 North, Range A East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
(Containing tpproxlmately 4264.68 acres.) 
TOGETHER WITH all water and water rights however evidenced 
appurtenant to or used upon or In connection wlfh said property. 
SUBJECT TO easements, restrictions and rights of way appearing 
of record or enforceable in law and equity, and taxes for the 
year 1965 and thereafter. 
WITNESS the hand sof said grantors, this 14 th day of 
Signed In the presence of — -
October A. a 19 65. 
I 
STATE OP UTAH 
COUOTY OF SALT LAO 
My iCpmmisdon Expires: 
12/21/67 
SSL 
On the 14th day of October A. a 1965 personally 
appeared before me 7. E. BATES, a l so known at P. Ephrala Batea, 
lnd^HA£"P. BATES, arliflrknovn as Mae T r i t c h e t t Bates, 
hla wife 
the signers of »be within Instrument who duly adbwwkdged 
» me that t ha ycxecuted the same, ' 
Notary Publk 
..Residing at . 
f
**v* r*n&zCS<L*Cit * 
Salt Lake Cltx,JUTah I 
ADDENDUM DOCUMENT "2" - 1973 CC&R's. 
DECLARAflONl 
Entry No. 1 2 0 3 6 7 l> *iSO 
RECORDrD ?-? * - 7 3 c' /» 3 9>' n *&/JA 
REQU531 , f W 8 re o + Jk A/St n — 
FEE w s^\ ' ( »i JAv^Mif as tecoxnu 
INDEXED -J ACblRACT ^ **\. 
DF* COVENANTS, CONDITIONS AND RESTRICTIONS 
THIS DECLARATION, made on this ^5 day of August, 1973, 
brBtfcE MEADOW RANCH, INC., hereinafter referred to as "Declarant." 
W I T N E S S E T H : 
WHEREAS, Declarant la the owner of or intends to acquire 
certain property in Summit County, State of Utah, which i s more 
particularly described as : 
The South one-half of sect ion 16; the East half of the Southeast 
quarter of Section 17; the East half of the East half of Section 
20; All of Section 21; a l l in Township 1 North, Range 4 East, 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian (containing approximately 1,200 acres) . 
NOW THEREFORE, Declarant hereby declares that a l l of the 
properties descriDed above shall be held, sold and conveyed 
subject to the following easements, restrictions, covenants, 
and conditions, which are for the purpose of protecting the 
value and des irabi l i ty of, and which shall run with, the real 
property and be binding on a l l parties having any right , t i t l e 
or interes t in the described properties or any part thereof, 
their he irs , successors and ass igns, and shall inure 'o the 
benefit of each owner chereof• 
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ARTICLE I 
DEFINITIONS 
Section 1, "Association" shall mean and refer to Pine 
Meadow Ranch Home Owners1 Association, its successors and assigns. 
Section 2. "Owner" shall mean and refer to the record owner, 
whether one or more persons or entities, of a fee simple title to 
any Lot which is a part of the Properties, including contract 
sellers, but excluding those having such interest merely as 
security for the performance of an obligation. 
Section 3. "Properties" shall mean and refer to that certain 
real property hereinbefore described, and such additions thereto as 
may hereafter b e brought within the jurisdiction of the Association. 
Section 4. "Common Area" shall mean all real property owned by 
the Association for the common use and enjoyment of the owners. The 
Common Area to be owned by the Association at che time of the conveyance 
of the first lot is described as follows: 
Section 5. "Lot" shall mean and refer to any plot of land shown 
upon any recorded subdivision map of the Properties with the exception 
of the Common Area. 
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Section 6. "Declarant" shall mean and refer to P-ne Meadow 
Ranch, Inc., its successors and assigns if such successors or assigns 
should acquire more than one undeveloped Lot from che Declarant for 
the purpose of development. 
ARTICLE II 
PROPERTY RIGHTS 
Section 1. Owner*-* Easements of Enjoyment. Every owner shall 
have a right and easement of enjoyment in and to the Common Area 
which shall be appurtenant to and shall pass with the title to every 
Lot, subject to the following provisions: 
(a) The right of the Association to charge reasonable 
admission and other fees for the use of any recreational 
facility situated upon the Common Area; 
(b) The right of the Association to suspend the voting 
rights and right to use of the recreational facilities by 
ai owner for any period during which any assessment against 
his Lot remains unpaid; and for a period not to exceed 60 days 
for any infraction of its published rules and regulations; 
(c) The right of the Association to indicate or transfer 
all or any part of the Common Area to any public agency, 
authority, or utility for such purposes and 3ubjert to such 
conditions as may be agreed to by the members. No sucn 
dedication or transfer shall be effective unless an instrument 
signed by two-thirds (2/3) of each member agreeing to such 
dedication or transfer has been recorded. 
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Section 2. Delegation of Use. Any owner may delegate, in 
accordance with the By-Laws, his right of enjoyment to the Common 
Area and facilities to the member* of his family, his tenants, or 
contract purchasers* 
ARTICLE III 
MEMBERSHIP AND VOTING RIGHTS 
Section 1. Every owner of a lot which is subject to assessment 
shall be a member of the Association. Membership shall be appurtenant 
to and may not be separated from ownership of any Lot which is subject 
to assessment. 
Section 2. The Association shall have only one class of voting 
membership. A member shall be all Owners *nd shall be entitled to 
one vote for each Lot owned. When more tl\an one person holds an 
interest in any Lot, all such persons shall be members. The vote 
for such Lot shall be exercised as they imong themselves determine, 
but in no event shall more than one vor<* be cast with respect to any Lot. 
ARTICLE IV 
COVENANTS FOR MAINTENANCE ASSESSMENTS 
Section 1« Creation of the Lien and Personal Obligation 
of Assessments. The Declarant, for each Lot owned within the 
Properties, hereby covenants, and each Owner of any Lot by 
acceptance of a deed therefor, whether of not it shall be so 
expressed in such deed, is deemed to covenant and agree to pay to 
the Association: (1) annual assessments or charges, and (2) 
special assessments for capital improvements, such assessments to 
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be eata'blished,,ittd collected &s hereinafter provided. The annual 
and special'assessments) together with interest, costs, and 
reasonable attorney's feeo, shall be a charge on the land and 
shall be a continuing lion upon the property against which each 
luch assessment is made. Each such assessment, together with 
interest, costs, and reasonable attorney's fees, shall also be 
the personal obligation of the person who was the Owner of such 
property at the time when the assessment fell due. The personal 
obligation for delinquent assessments shall not pass to his 
successors in title unless expressly assumed by them. 
Section 2. Purpose of Assessments. The assessments levied 
by the Association shall be used exclusively to promote the 
recreation, health, safety, and welfare of the residents in the 
Properties and for the improvement and maintenance of the recorded 
roads, Common Area, and of the homes situated upon the Properties. 
Section 3. It is agreed that the Association has the right, 
in the event any member allows his lot or lots to become an eye-sore, 
unattractive, or a nuisance by taeans of neglect ot carelessness, to 
cause the lot to be corrected. The cost of such correction to be 
paid by the members and to become a liin on the lot being so corrected. 
However, before the Association can take such action the member roust 
be given 30-days written notice by registered mail. 
Section A. Special Assessments for Capital improvements. In 
addition to the annual assessments authorized above, the Association 
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nay levy/-In any assessment y^ar, a special assessment applicable 
to thati year only for the purpose of defraying, In whole or In part, 
the/coat,of any construction, reconstruction, repair or replacement 
of a capital Improvement upon the Common Area, Including fixtures 
and personal property related thereto, provided that any such 
assessment *hall have the assent of two-thirds (2/3) of the votes 
of each member whom are voting in person or by proxy at a meeting 
duly called for this purpose. 
Section 5« Notice and Quorum for Any Action Authorized Under 
Section 3. Written notice ot any meeting called for the purpose 
of taking any action authorized under Section 3 shall be 3ent to all 
members not less than 30 days nor more than 60 days in advance of the 
meeting. At the first such meeting called, the presence of members 
or of proxies entitled to cast sixty percent (60Z) of ail the votes 
of each class of membership shall constitute a quorum. If the 
required quorum is not present, another meeting may be called 
subject to the same notice requirement, and the required quorum at 
the subsequent meeting shall b*» one-half (1/2) of the required 
quorum at the preceding meeting. No such subsequent meeting shall 
be held more than 60 days following the preceding meeting. 
Section 6. Uniform Rate of Assessment. Bo\-h annual and 
special assessments must be fixed at a uniform rate for services 
provided for all Lots, and may be collected on a monthly, quarterly 
or annual basis. 
Section 7. Date of Commencement of Annual Assessments: Due Dates. 
The annual assessments provided for herein shall commence as to all 
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Lots on the first day of the month following the conveyance of the 
*• V * 
Common Area. The first annual assessment shall be adjusted according 
to the number of months remaining in v\e calendar year. The Board 
of Directors shall fix the amount of the annual assessment against 
each Lot at least thirty (30) days in advance of Gach annual 
assessment period* Written notice of the annual assessment shall 
be sent to evev ^wner subject thereto. The due dates shall ^e 
established by the Board of Directors. The Association sha'l, upon 
demand, and for a reasonable charge, furnish a certificate signed 
by an officer of the association s&tling forth whether the assess-
ments on a specified Lot have been paid* 
Section 8. Effect of Nonpayment of Assessments* Remedies of 
the Association. Any assessment not paid within thirty (30) days 
after the due date shall bear interest from the due date at the rate 
of evolve percent (12%) per annum. The Association may bring an 
action at law against the Owner personally obligated to ,>ay the 
same, or foreclose the lien against the property No owner may 
waive or otherwise escape liability for the assessments provx^ed 
for herein by non-use of the Common Area or abondonment of his Lot. 
Section 9. Subordination of the Lien to Mortgages. The lien 
of the assessmento provided for herein shall be subordinate to the 
lien ot any first mortgage. Sale or transfer of any Lot shall not 
affect the assessment lien. However, the sale or transtar of any 
lot pursuant to mortgage foreclosure or any proceeding in lieu 
thereof, shall extinguish the lien of such assrasments as to 
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payroents which became due prior to such sale °r transfer. No sale 
or transfer shall relieve such Lot from liability for any assessments 
thereafter becoming due or from ttw lien thereof. 
Section 10. Rubbish removal. It is agreeded that the association will 
contract annually to remove the personal rubbish from a common pick-up area. 
ARTICLE V 
ARCHITECTURAL CONTROL 
No building, fence, wall or other structure shall be commenced, erected 
or maintained upon the Properties, nor shall any exterior addition to or 
change or alteration therein be made until the plans and specifications 
shoving the general nature, kind, shape, height, materials, and location of 
the same shall have been submitted to and approver' in writing as lo harmony 
of external design and location in relation to surrounding structures and 
topography by the Board of Directors of the Association, or by an architectural 
committee composed of three (3) or more representatives appointed by the Board. 
In the event said Board, or its designated committee, fails to approve or 
disapprove such design and location within thirty (30) days after said plans 
and specifications have been submitted to iti approval will not be required and 
this Article will bo deemed to have been fully complied with. 
ARTICLE VI 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Section 1. Enforcement. The Association, or any Owner, shall 
have the right to enforce, by any proceeding law or in equity, 
all restrictions, conditions, covenants, reservations, liens and 
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charges now or hereafter imposed by the provisions of this Declaration. 
Failure by the Association or by any Ovmer to enforce any covenants 
or restriction herein contained shall in no event be deemed a 
waiver of the right to de so thereafter. 
Section 2. Severability. Invalidation of any one of these 
covenants or restrictions by judgment or court order shall in no 
wise affect any other provisions which shall remain in full force 
and effect. 
Section 3. Amendment. The covenants and restrictions of 
This Declaration shall run with and bind the land, for a term of 
twenty (20) years from the date this Declaration is recorded, 
after which time they ohall be automatically extended for 
successive periods of ten (10) years. This Declaration may be 
amended during the first twenty (20) year period by an instrument 
signed by not less than ninety percent (90%) of the Lot Owners, 
ai*d thereafter by an instrument signed by not less than seventy-five 
percent (75%) of the Lot Owners. Any amendment must be recorded. 
Section 4. Annexation. Additional property and Common 
Area may be annexed to the Properties with the consent of two-
thirds (2/3) of the outstanding votes. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being the Declarant herein, 
has hereunto set its hand and seal this 15 day of August 1973 
PTNF, MFADOW RANCH 
Declarant ^ 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF-SA*#=&\KE ) 
On the 28th day of September 1973, personally appeared before 
mr W. Brent Jensen, who being by me duly sworn, did say that he is the 
President of Pine Meadow Ranch and that said lnstrunment was signed 
in behalf of said corporation by authority of its by-laws, and said 
W. Brent Jensen acknowledged to me that said corporation executed the 
_M1^ -
7
 ri 
Reed D Pace, Notar) Public 
Residing in Summit County H W . t l 
My Commission Expires. 
February lg , 1975 
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TATE OF UTAH ) 
ounty of Summit ) 
I, Alan f * :f:~*:, Ccjn!y R-jconier in and for Summit Oounty, State of Utah, 
o herebv cc..*iv inzi the aitacr.od and foregoing is a full, true and correct copy 
rthat certain fai ^
 t f CcVawnbtCc-r>Aih'^ AM 
'hich appears of record in my office in Book / I K £ » PaQ0 £xQl~ 539 
eing Entry No. /J2£<7(r 7 
. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, | hive hereunto set my hand and affixed my 
fficial seal, the //-/ % day of Ottemhf r 19fZf/L-
7/ 
mm^.r^w, 
77 
Summit County Ffecor46r 
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7Z/^ 
Wesley Bre^ht Jensen 
President 
Eirrc vt« P( esident 
SECURITY 
u 
Zena J ' J e n s 
Secretary 
T f T L E C O J R U S 
As* Sec re ta r y 
STATE O r UT.AH 
Cour t | of Salt Lakr* 
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ADDENDUM DOCUMENT "4" - OPINION OF COURT OF APPEALS. 
FILED 
U TAH APPELLATE COURTS 
JUN 3 0 2005 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OOOoo 
Paul Howard Peters, 
Petitioner and Appellant, 
Pine Meadow Ranch Home 
Association aka Pine Meadow 
Ranch Home Owners Association 
and as Pine Meadow Ranch 
Association, 
Respondent and Appellee. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20040396-CA 
F I L E D 
(June 30, 2005) 
2005 UT App 265 
Third District, Silver Summit Department, 990600413 
The Honorable Bruce Lubeck 
Attorneys: Boyd Kimball Dyer, Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
Edwin C. Barnes and Walter A. Romney, Jr., Salt Lake 
City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Bench, Greenwood, and Jackson. 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
Petitioner Paul Howard Peters appeals the trial court's 
grant of Respondent Pine Meadow Ranch Home Association's motion 
for summary judgment. We affirm. 
When reviewing a trial court's grant of a motion for summary 
judgment, this court reviews for correctness, giving no deference 
to the trial courtfs conclusions of law, and considers all 
evidence and reasonable inferences derived therefrom in the light 
most favorable to the losing party below. See Black v. Allstate 
Ins. Co. , 2004 UT 66,f9, 100 P.3d 1163. Summary judgment is 
proper only when there is no genuine issue of material fact and 
"the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
We addressed most of Petitioner's arguments on appeal in 
Forest Meadow Ranch Property Owners Ass'n, L.L.C. v. Pine Meadow 
Ranch Home Ass'n, 2005 UT App 264, also issued today. Because 
the facts of this case closely track those of Forest Meadow, 
where applicable, the same reasoning applies. Indeed, the facts 
in the instant case provide even stronger support for our 
reasoning in Forest. 
First, Petitioner argues that Respondent shoulders the 
burden to show both that a trust existed and that descriptio 
personae does not apply to the Bates Deed--the deed by which Lot 
6, among others, was transferred to Security Title Company 
(Security). In this case, while there was no mention of a trust 
beneficiary on the face of the Bates Deed, there is sufficient 
extrinsic evidence indicating the existence of a trust with 
Respondent as beneficiary to overcome the presumptive application 
of descriptio personae. See id. at ff29-30. To wit, 
Petitioner's title traces back to Security, the entity that took 
title to the property in the Bates Deed as "trustee." Further, 
before Security transferred Lot 6, (1) Respondent and Security, 
acting together, filed Pine Meadow Ranch Plat "D" (Plat D), 
identifying Respondent as owner and subdivider and Security as 
"trustee," and (2) Respondent recorded the 1973 Covenants, 
Conditions, and Restrictions (the 1973 CC&Rs), which affect Lot 6 
and specifically prescribe that each owner "pay to [Respondent]: 
. . . annual assessments or charges," as well as "interest, 
costs, and reasonable attorney[] fees." Additionally, the 1973 
CC&Rs provide that assessments are a continuing lien on the 
properties. We view this evidence sufficient to overcome 
descriptio personaefs presumption that no trust existed. 
Second, Petitioner contends that the 1973 CC&Rs do not run 
with the land for want of privity of estate. However, 
traditional notions of privity of estate exist here. For 
example, there is horizontal privity here because the 1973 CC&Rs 
were created in anticipation of subdividing and selling lots. 
See id. at f35. Furthermore, there is vertical privity because 
Petitioner is a successor to the estate of the original 
covenanting parties. See id. 
Third, Petitioner urges that it could not encumber Lot 6 
with the 1973 CC&Rs because Respondent had only a beneficial 
interest in the land granted in the Bates Deed. However, 
Security, as trustee, ratified Respondent's encumbrance of Lot 6 
when it and Respondent filed Plat D. See id. at 1(36. 
Fourth, Petitioner argues that the 1973 CC&Rs violate the 
doctrine of uniformity because they cover only 219 of 444 lots in 
the Pine Meadows Subdivision. However, "the doctrine of 
uniformity has not been adopted in Utah, and Petitioner did not 
allege facts sufficient to warrant an examination of the doctrine 
in this case." Id. at 1(3 9. 
Fifth, Petitioner posits that this court's holding in Dunlap 
v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 2003 UT App 283, 76 P.3d 
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711, cert, denied, 84 P.3d 239 (Utah 2004), refutes an inference 
of the trust's existence drawn from the 1973 CC&Rs. 
Specifically, Petitioner claims that because we disregarded the 
Dunlap plaintiffs1 inference of ownership from "a stray title," 
id. at fll, that we must also disregard Respondent's inference of 
ownership from the 1973 CC&Rs because there was no recorded deed 
whereby Security granted Lot 6 to Respondent. However, Dunlap 
does not compel such reasoning. Here, unlike the situation 
presented in Dunlap, Respondent is a homeowners association 
seeking to act in that capacity by placing covenants, conditions, 
and restrictions on subdivided property. Additionally, unlike 
Dunlap, Respondent is not an adverse party claiming superior 
title vis-a-vis a competing owner. Rather, Respondent was acting 
as an agent of Security, regardless of whether the owner was 
Security or a trust with Security as trustee because W. Brent 
Jensen acted as president of both Respondent and Security. Also, 
in Dunlap, Park City Development's interest fell outside a 
reasonable grantor and grantee index search, see id. , whereas 
here, reasonable title research of Lot 6 would have revealed the 
possibility of a trust, raising inquiry notice. 
Finally, Petitioner argues, without citing authority, that 
the trial court erred when it concluded that "even if [the 1973 
CC&Rs] are not restrictive covenants that run with the land, they 
are restrictions that were contractually agreed upon [by 
Petitioner's] predecessors in interest and the developer of the 
subdivision." However, we agree with the trial court. The 1973 
CC&Rs, coupled with the deed language, bind Respondent and its 
members, respectively, to collect and pay yearly homeowners 
association assessments. See Forest Meadow, 2005 UT App 264 at 
136. 
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's ruling. 
WE CONCUR: 
Russell W. Bench, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
